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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
I.

Statement of Jurisdiction

Hodges appeals the final order dismissing his claims against Howell as signed
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on June 16, 1999. (R. at 210). Rule 54(b)
certification was not necessary as the June 16, 1999 order dismissed all remaining
claims between the parties.1 Hodges timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12,
1999.2 There are no pending claims, post judgment motions or parties before the trial
court. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1996).
II. Statement of the Issues Presented for Review and Standard of Review
Two issues are presented for review.
First, did the trial court err when it held that the one-year statute of
limitations for seduction found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996) also

1

A previous order dated March 8, 1999 dismissed Hodges' claims against
Howell's company and the employer of Hodges' wife, namely Salt Lake Mortgage
Company. (R. at 104). The June 16, 1999 order not only dismissed Hodges' remaining
claims but also dismissed the third party complaint filed by Howell and Salt Lake
Mortgage Company which sought to compare the fault of Linda Hodges. These two
orders together dismissed the matter in its entirety and both are attached as Exhibit "A" to
the Addendum of this brief.
2

A copy of Hodges' Notice of Appeal is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Addendum
of this brief.
1

applies to alienation of affection claims even though the tort of alienation of
affections is not specifically enumerated therein.
Second, did the trial court err in granting Howell's Motion for Summary
Judgment when it determined that there were no genuine disputes as to any of the
material facts associated with the question of when Hodges' claim for alienation
of affections accrued and further failed to make findings of fact which would
support its ruling that Hodges' claim for alienation of affections accrued more
than one year prior to the filing of his complaint.
On appeal, the question of whether summary judgment is appropriate is a
question of law. Consequently, no deference is given to the trial court's decision.
The same is true for the trial court's determination of which statute of limitation
applies to a particular cause of action. Therefore, these issues are examined for
correctness. See Wilson v. Vallev Mental Health. 969 P.2d 416,418 (Utah 1998);
Klingerv.Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990).
The trial court's findings of fact are given deference and reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard keeping in mind that the facts must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1989V see also Owns v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187,1188 (Utah 1989). On
appeal, a party challenging the trial court's findings of fact must fully and
accurately marshall the facts adverse to his or her position and demonstrate that
2

the evidence did not support such a conclusion. Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425,
433-34 (Utah 1998). The adequacy of a trial court's findings of fact must be
sufficiently detailed and include enough facts to show the evidence upon which
they are grounded. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Ut. Ct. App 1991).
Inadequate findings of fact warrant remand for more detailed findings. kL at 478.
Hodges preserved these arguments in his Memorandum in Opposition to
Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment where he argued that the residual fouryear statute of limitations applies to his alienation of affection claims. (R. at 16689). He likewise argued that material questions of fact existed regarding when his
claim for alienation of affections accrued such that summary judgment was not
proper. Id
III.

Determinative Statutes

The trial court accepted Howell's arguments that Utah Code Ann. § 78-1229(4) (1996), which establishes a one-year statute of limitations for the tort of
seduction, also applies to alienation of affections claims. Section 78-1229(4)(1996) provides as follows:
An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given
to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the
statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation;
3

(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction:
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property
caused by a mob or riot;
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits
the time for action to four-years, under Section 25-6-10; or
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).
(Emphasis added). Hodges argues that § 78-12-29(4) is not applicable to a claim
for alienation of affections and, instead, asserts that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (3)
establishes the statute of limitations applicable to alienation of affection claims. It
states as follows:
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on
an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials
furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made
or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits
the time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);

4

(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
(Emphasis added). Copies of these two statutes are attached as Exhibit "C" to the
Addendum of this brief for the convenience of the Court and counsel. There are
no other statutes or cases in Utah which are determinative of the issues presented
for review.
IV.

Statement of the Case

This litigation arises out of the purposeful and predatory conduct of Howell
wherein he pursued the affections of Linda Hodges, the then wife of Hodges and
mother of his children.3 Knowing full well that Linda Hodges was married to
Hodges, Howell, through his money and position of power as Linda Hodges'
employer, succeeded in his pursuit of Linda Hodges which led to an illicit affair
and the eventual breakup of the Hodges' marriage and family through divorce. To
this day, Howell and Linda Hodges are a couple and share between themselves the
most intimate of affections. (R. at 167-71).
Linda Hodges eventually filed for divorce and the divorce was finalized on
February 4, 1998. (R. at 169,171). Thereafter, Hodges filed suit against Howell
and his company, Salt Lake Mortgage Company, on October 20, 1998, alleging
that Howell's intentional pursuit of Linda Hodges during her marriage to Hodges

3

Ryan and Linda Hodges were married on April 14,1983. They had three children
during their marriage ~ Megan, Daks and Madison. (R. at 167, n. 1)
5

constituted a purposeful effort to secure her affections and, at the same time,
alienate her affections towards Hodges. (R. at 1-7). Hodges' principal cause of
action against Howell is the tort of alienation of affections ("AOA"). IcL
Howell moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations
found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996) which establishes a one-year
limitations period for the tort of seduction, not AOA. (R. at 111-61). Howell
further argued that the facts showed that Hodges knew that his relationship with
his wife and her affections for him were irretrievably broken by January 20,1997.
(K at 1J 6-J 7). Applying this fact to the alleged one-year statute of limitations,
argued Howell, demonstrated that the deadline for Hodges to file his AOA claim
was January 20,1998. Thus, Hodges complaint, which was filed on October 20,
1998, was untimely and barred by the one-year statute of limitations for the tort of
seduction. (R. at 117-20).
Hodges opposed Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 166-89).
Hodges argued that the statute of limitations for the tort of seduction does not
apply to the tort of AOA because AOA is unrelated — in every way - to the tort of
seduction. Hodges argued further that the applicable statute of limitations for his
AOA claim is Utah's four-year residual or "catch-all" statute of limitation found at
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1996). (R. at 177-79).

6

Hodges also disputed Howell's "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts"
and set forth additional facts which demonstrated that genuine issues of material
fact exist as to when his cause of action for AOA accrued — even if the one-year
statute of limitations applied. (R. at 179-80).
The trial court granted Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment based on
the briefs filed by the parties and without conducting oral argument on the matter.
The trial court held that the one-year statute of limitations for the tort of seduction
enumerated at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) also applies to claims for AOA. The
tria] court further ruled that the facts demonstrated that Hodges' AOA cause of
action accrued more than one-year prior to the filing of his complaint. In its
minute entry, the trial court did not acknowledge or address the facts submitted by
Hodges in opposition to Howell's motion for summary judgment; nor did it make
any findings of fact as to when Hodges' AOA cause of action accrued. Instead,
the trial court simply stated that Hodges' AOA claim accrued more than one year
prior to the filing of his complaint on October 20, 1999. (R. at 208; see also Order
and Final Judgment, R. at 211, Tf 1).
A.

Statement of Facts

In support of his position that the trial court erred when it determined
that his cause of action for AOA accrued more than one year prior to the filing of
his complaint, Hodges marshalls the following pertinent facts demonstrating that
7

genuine issues of material fact exist as to when his cause of action for AOA
accrued for statute of limitations purposes.
1.

Ryan and Linda Hodges were married on April 14, 1983. (R. at

2.

In the Fall of 1995, Hodges learned of his wife's ongoing friendship

113).

with Howell and that it was beginning to impact the Hodges' marriage. (R. at
113-14,153-54).
3.

The Hodges remained together through the majority of 1996.

However, in the late Fall of 1996 they separated for a period of time. (R. at 114,
140-41).
4.

The Hodges reconciled and resumed living together in December of

1996. (R. at 140).
5.

On January 20,1997, Hodges saw his wife with Howell and was

concerned that their marriage may be headed for divorce rather than
reconciliation. (R. at 116, 142). In fact, he stated that he knew they were going to
get a divorce at that time. (Id)
6.

Even though Hodges moved out of their home shortly thereafter,

Hodges had not made up his mind to seek a divorce and he still held out hope that
he and his wife would reconcile and that she would consider terminating her
relationship with Howell. (R. at 143-45).
8

7.

In fact, the Hodges attended marriage counseling sessions together in

late 1996 and in the first quarter of 1997. (R. at 139).
8.

Hodges continued to want to work on his marriage and still hoped for

reconciliation including up and through the time of their last counseling session in
the first quarter of 1997. (R. at 186 (Hodges deposition page 157)).
9.

Linda Hodges filed for divorce in late January of 1997. (R. at 4).

10.

In the first quarter of 1997, Hodges and his wife decided to sell their

home. The home sold in May or June of 1997. (R. at 117, 150-51)
11.

In the summer of 1997, Hodges began dating another woman, six

months after he and Linda Hodges separated for the last time in January of 1997.
(R. at 117, 138).
12.

Throughout the divorce process, Hodges remained hopeful and

believed there was a chance he and his wife could reconcile. (R. at 189 (Hodges
deposition at 311-12)).
13.

Hodges further testified in his deposition that his wife and Howell

denied having an affair until they were deposed in October of 1997 in the context
of the Hodges' divorce proceedings. (R. at 189 (Hodges deposition at 314)); (see
also R. at 4, f 20).
14.

The Hodges' divorce was finalized on February 4, 1998. (R. at 170).

9

15.

Hodges' complaint in this matter was filed with the Third District

Court on October 20, 1998. (R. at 1).
V.

Summary of Argument

The one-year statute governing the tort of seduction does not apply to AOA
claims. In fact, AOA claims are elementally different in every way from the tort
of seduction. Utah case law and statutes clearly define the act of seduction as
requiring the enticement of an unmarried individual under the age of 18 to have
unlawful sexual intercourse. See, e.g.. Bowers v. Carter. 59 Utah 249. 250-51.
202 P. 1093,1094-95 (Utah 1921); see also Utah Code Ann.§§ 78-11-4, 5 (1996).
By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically stated that the tort of AOA
does not include sexual contact or intercourse as a necessary element of the claim.
see Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, in seduction,
the person seduced must be under the age of 18 and must not be married. In AOA
settings, marriage is a necessary element.
Also, the tort of AOA is much more akin to personal injury or wrongful
death claims, both of which are typically governed by statutes of limitation of at
least two years, and as many as four years. On at least two occasions, the Utah
Supreme Court has compared the tort of AOA with wrongful death claims, and it
equated the two claims together by noting that each involve the loss of society,

10

love, companionship, protection and affection. See Norton. 818 P.2d at 11-12; see
also Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Utah 1983).
Finally, even if the one-year statute of limitations for seduction applies to
Hodges' AOA claim, the trial court erred when it construed the disputed facts as to
when Hodges' AOA cause of action accrued in favor of Howell, the moving party.
More specifically, Hodges set forth facts in his opposing memorandum that, when
construed in a light most favorable to him (as required by law), created a genuine
issue of material fact as to when his AOA cause of action accrued for statute of
limitations purposes. Hodges established facts demonstrating that he still held out
hope for reconciliation and was willing to work together with his estranged wife to
repair the damage to their marriage and raise their children together as husband
and wife, even after Linda Hodges filed for divorce. (R. at 168-71). The law
encourages reconciliation and any efforts that may preserve the marital
relationship. The law further presumes that there is always a possibility of
reconciliation up until the divorce is finalized. To force Hodges to file a
complaint for AOA while still holding out hope for reconciliation with his wife,
which would occur if a one-year statute of limitations applies, would defeat the
clear public policy favoring reconciliation and would force Hodges to risk losing
the opportunity to reconcile by prematurely filing a lawsuit.

11

VI.
A.

Argument

HODGES' CLAIM FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS IS NOT
GOVERNED BY THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR SEDUCTION.
Howell's summary judgment motion hinged on the flawed presumption that

the tort of AOA is subject to the one-year statute of limitations found at Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-29(4), and on the misguided inferences Howell draws from Hodges'
deposition testimony as to when the AOA was complete and a cause of action for
the same accrued. As demonstrated below, § 78-12-29(4) does not govern the tort
of AOA and Howell's reliance on that section is wholly misplaced. Instead,
Hodges' AOA claim is governed by Utah's four-year residual statute of
limitations.4
1.

The tort of AOA is not a specified tort under the oneyear statute of limitations found at §78-12-29(4), and
the tort of seduction is not at all related to the tort of
AOA.

Title 78, Chapter 12 of the Utah Code establishes various statutes of
limitation applicable to the commencement of civil actions. The statute of
limitations relied on by Howell is found within Article 2 of Chapter 12. It
establishes a one-year statute of limitations for specific enumerated torts:
4

Hodges does not concede that his AOA cause of action cannot survive a one-year
statute of limitation. In fact, there are sufficient facts creating a genuine dispute as to
when Hodges' cause of action for AOA accrued ~ even if this Court concludes that
Utah's one-year statute of limitations for seduction applies to Hodges' AOA claim.
12

An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given
to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the
statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation;
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction:
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property
caused by a mob or riot;
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits
the time for action to four-years, under Section 25-6-10; or
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 (1998 Supp.) (emphasis added). The tort of AOA is
not enumerated or described whatsoever in § 78-12-29. Notwithstanding that
obvious fact, Howell relied on subsection (4) of § 78-12-29 in his Motion for
Summary Judgment and argued that the tort of AOA is akin to the tort of
seduction. The trial court agreed. However, the fact of the matter is that seduction
has very little, if anything, in common with AOA.
AOA is an intentional tort against the person. See Nelson v. Jacobsen.
669 P.2d 1207, 1217 (Utah 1983): see also Norton. 818 P.2d at 10. Aplaintiff
alleging AOA must be prepared to demonstrate three necessary elements in order
to present a prima facia claim for AOA. First, he or she must establish that they
13

had a happy marriage and that genuine love and affection existed between them.
Second, an AOA plaintiff must prove that the love and affection existing in the
marriage was alienated and destroyed. Third, he or she must show that the
wrongful and malicious acts of the defendant produced and brought about the loss
and alienation of the love and affection that existed in the marriage, and that the
defendant's conduct was the controlling cause of the alienation. See Nelson. 669
P.2datl218.
Seduction, on the other hand, is a cause of action that accrues with the
seducer having carnal knowledge of the victim. The Utah Supreme Court defines
seduction as follows:
The act of seducing; enticement to wrongdoing; specifically the
offense of inducing a woman to consent to unlawful sexual intercourse,
by enticements which overcome her scruples; the wrong or crime of
persuading a woman to surrender her chastity. . . the word 'seduced,'
when applied to the conduct of a man toward a woman, has a defined
and well-understood meaning; and a charge that defendant 'seduced,
debauched, and carnally knew' plaintiff is tantamount to saying that he
used some undue influence, artifice, deceit, fraud, or made some
promise to induce the plaintiff to surrender her chastity and virtue to
him.
Bowers v. Carter. 59 Utah 249, 250-51, 202 P. 1093, 1094-95 (Utah 1921)
(citations omitted). This definition plainly demonstrates the significant
differences between the tort of seduction and the tort of AOA. First, the tort of
seduction requires that "sexual intercourse" occur. However, there is nothing
14

inherent in the tort of AOA requiring sexual contact to be part of the act or acts
upon which an AOA claim is founded. See Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1216 (Utah 1983).
In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court made it very clear that the tort of AOA is not
about sex; nor is sex a necessary element to the cause of action. Instead, the
underlying basis for the tort of AOA is built "on the premise that each spouse has
a valuable interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy,
companionship, support, duties, and affection." Id.
In Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
emphasized this point in even greater detail.
[T]he tort of AOA protects the marriage relationship from a
variety of assaults by third persons, whether extramarital sexual affairs
are involved or not. Sexual misconduct is only one means of destroying
spousal affections. The gist of the tort is the protection of the love,
society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a
marriage and give rise to the unique bonding that occurs in a successful
marriage.
Id, at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, the tort of AOA was established to
protect the marriage from third party attacks. Unlike claims for seduction, an
AOA cause of action does not require that the attack on the marriage include an
extramarital affair or sexual relations.
The tort of seduction is further distinguishable from the tort of AOA. As
defined in Bowers, seduction typically involves enticing a person to surrender his
or her virtue and chastity through "artifice, deceit, [or] fraud " Bowers. 202 P.
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at 1094-95. Here, there was no trickery, deceit, fraud or artifice in Howell's
actions. Instead, Howell made a bold, obvious and premeditated play for the
affections of Hodges' wife and she voluntarily and knowingly chose to accept
those advances in spite of her marital vows to Hodges.5
Furthermore, neither Hodges nor Linda Hodges could, under any
circumstances relevant to this litigation, bring a claim for seduction. Instead,
under Utah law, seduction must involve a minor, unmarried individual. The
seduction statute states as follows.
An unmarried individual, under 18 years of age at the time of seduction,
may prosecute as plaintiff an action therefor, and may recover therein
such damages, actual or exemplary as are assessed in favor of such
individual.
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-4 (1996); see also § 78-11-5 (1996) (permitting parents or
guardians to prosecute claims for the seduction of minor children).
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has already cautioned against equating the
tort of AOA with that of seduction. In Norton, the Utah Supreme Court agreed
that "it is by no means certain that all four actions [AOA, seduction, criminal
conversation and breach of promise to marry] should be lumped together for
identical treatment." Norton. 818 P.2d at 13, n. 9. In fact, the Utah Supreme

5

Hodges did not plead the tort of seduction in his complaint. Had he done so, the
cause of action for seduction would have accrued with the last act of seduction. See
Slawek v. Stroh. 215 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Wis. 1974).
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Court discussed the tort of wrongful death ~ which is subject to a two-year statute
of limitations — in terms strikingly familiar to those defining AOA.
It is the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and
affection which usually constitute the heart of the [wrongful death]
action. Stated somewhat differently, this Court has stated that recovery
may be had for "the loss of affection, counsel and advice, the loss of
deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of his or her family and
the loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of [the]deceased would
have received...."
Id at 11-12 (emphasis added).
In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court evaluated the claims of a defendant who
sought a ruling abolishing the AOA cause of action. Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1207. In
its decision to preserve the rights of a victimized spouse to sue for AOA, the Utah
Supreme Court felt that AOA claims deserve as much protection as the cause of
action for wrongful death.
Our wrongful death statutes have long recognized the value of a
plaintiffs interest in his or her relationships with family members.
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. We have repeatedly sustained a
plaintiffs right to recover for the loss of society, love, companionship,
protection and affection which usually constitute the heart of the
[wrongful death] action. The marital relationship is entitled to as much
protection as these.
Id at 1215 (emphasis added). It follows that if a person victimized by the
wrongful death of his or her spouse is entitled to two years to bring suit, so too
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should a victim who loses his or her spouse as a result of the alienation of his or
her affections by a third party have at least equal time to pursue his or her claims.6
Furthermore, not only is the tort of AOA not enumerated in section 78-1229, this statute also is not the exclusive statute of limitation for all intentional
torts. Rather, there are numerous statutes establishing different - and usually
longer - limitations periods for various intentional torts. See Utah Code Ann.§§
78-12-25(2) (establishing a four-year statute of limitation for actions based on the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act); 78-12-25.1 (establishing a four-year statute of
limitation for actions involving the sexual abuse of a child); 78-12-26
(establishing a three-year statute of limitation for actions based on fraud or injury
to property); 78-12-28 (establishing a two-year statute of limitation for wrongful
death actions caused both by negligence and intentional conduct).

6

In May of 1997, the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (1997)
which specifically established the right of an individual to sue for loss of consortium
resulting from personal injury sustained by his or her spouse as a result of the wrongful or
negligent actions of a third person. Under this statute, the spouse's consortium claims are
subject to the same statute of limitations that applies to the other spouses' personal injury
claims. Id. at § 30-2-11(3). Thus, if the spouse's personal injuries were caused by
wrongful death or medical malpractice, the statute of limitations for the consortium
claims would be two years. See idL at § 78-12-28(2) (establishing two-year limitations
period for wrongful death); and § 78-14-4(1) (establishing two-year limitations period for
medical malpractice claims). Personal injuries arising out of negligent acts, such as
automobile accidents, slip and falls, and other intentional acts not covered by Section 7812-29(4), would subject consortium claims to the four-year residual statute of limitations
found at Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25 (1996).
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In short, the torts of AOA and seduction are vastly different and clearly
unrelated to each other. That being the case, it is disingenuine and misleading for
Howell to attempt to lump together the two claims for statute of limitations
purposes. Furthermore, as is demonstrated below, there are other statutes of
limitation which bear a greater and more logical fit to Hodges' AOA claim.7
2.

The tort of AOA is subject to the four-year statute of
limitations found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25
because it is not specifically enumerated in § 78-1229.

As argued above, the tort of AOA is not enumerated in the one-year statute
of limitations found at § 78-12-29 and is not sufficiently related to the tort of
seduction (which is specifically enumerated in § 78-12-29) to warrant lumping the
two together for statute of limitations purposes. This leaves the question of which
statute of limitations applies if the one-year limitation period of § 78-12-29 does
not.
7

In his motion for summary judgment, Howell cites the case of Tolman v. K-Mart
Enterprises of Utah. Inc.. 650 P.2d 1127, 1128 (Utah 1997) in support of his argument
that AOA is related to the tort of seduction and should be subject to the one-year statute
of limitations that applies to seduction. In Tolman. the Utah Supreme Court held that the
tort of false arrest is subject to the same statute of limitations that applies to the tort of
false imprisonment because false arrest is "but an aspect of false imprisonment...." Id.
In other words, false arrest is typically a sub-part or a component of false imprisonment if
not itself a form of false imprisonment. Here, AOA is not a component of seduction, nor
are the two torts in any way related. The only similarity between the two is that sexual
intercourse is only one of many possible causes of the AOA but is not the only or
required cause, whereas sexual intercourse is a necessary element claim for seduction.
Howell's reliance on Tolman is therefore misplaced.
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The Utah Supreme Court has provided on-point analysis which
demonstrates that the four-year residual statute of limitations found at Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25(3) should apply to the tort of AOA. Section 78-12-25(3)
represents the Utah Legislature's efforts to provide a residual or "catch-all" statute
of limitations for any causes of action which are not otherwise explicitly
enumerated in other provisions establishing limitations periods. Subsection (3) of
Utah's residual statue of limitations applies to all actions "for relief not otherwise
provided for by law." Id The Utah Supreme Court explained the use of this
catch-all provision in Olsen v. Hooley. 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993).
A cause of action, such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, that is not subject to a specific statutory limitations period is
governed by the residual four-year limitations period found in § 78-1225(3). Intentional infliction of emotional distress, although traditionally
viewed as an intentional tort, is not one of the torts enumerated in § 7812-29(4) that have a one-year limitations period, and therefore falls
within the residual statute of limitations.
Id. at 1347 n. 1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Retherford v.
AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992) (comparing AOA with
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because both often involve "a
series of wrongful acts over a substantial period of time ...").
The above-analysis is plainly demonstrative of Hodges' position in this
case. Just as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ('TIED") is not
enumerated in § 78-12-29, so too is the intentional tort of AOA omitted from
20

reference therein. Thus, while Hodges concedes that AOA is an intentional tort, as
is IIED and seduction, AOA is no more related to seduction than any of the other
intentional torts subject to other longer limitation periods. Therefore, because the
tort of AOA is not assigned to a specific statute of limitation it is necessarily
governed by the four-year "catch all" limitations period found in § 78-12-25(3).
Courts in other states have taken a similar approach and held that AOA
claims are governed by residual or general statutes of limitation. See Schwartz v.
Valinskv. 294 N.E.2d 446,447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) (general limitations period
for torts applies to claims for AOA); see also Gibson v. Gibson. 402 S.W.2d 647,
650 (Ark. 1968) (one-year statute of limitations for false imprisonment, slander
and assault which does not mention AOA claims does not apply; instead, five-year
statute of limitations for torts in general applies to claims of AOA); Smith v.
Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141 (Ohio 1918) (holding that four year general or catch-all
statute of limitations governing claims "not arising on contract" applied to AOA
claims); Farrow v. Roderique. 224 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. App. 1949) (applying general
statute of limitations of five years to AOA claims in the absence of a statute
specifically enumerating claims for AOA); Bassett v. Bassett. 20 111. App. 543
(111. 1886); Woodman v. Goodrich. 234 Wis. 565,291 N.W. 768, 769 (Wis.
1940) (six-year limitation period for claims not arising in contract or not otherwise
expressly provided for by statute applies to AOA claims).
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The Gibson court noted the common and well-reasoned rule that courts
should be reluctant to "apply a statute of limitations to actions not specifically
enumerated therein." Gibson. 402 S.W.2d at 648. Hodges therefore requests this
Court to rule consistent with the decision in the Olsen case and rule that claims for
AOA are governed by the residual four-year statute of limitations found at Utah
Code Ann. §78-25-12(3).
B.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO WHEN
HODGES' AOA CLAIM ACCRUED WHICH PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Wineear v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). In ruling on summary
judgment motions, trial courts are advised to view the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See kL
Howell argues that Hodges' cause of action for AOA accrued no later than
January of 1997. Assuming this to be true, for the sake of argument, Howell's
application of a one-year statute of limitation would clearly bar Hodges'
complaint which was filed one year and nearly nine months later (October 1998).
However, even if the one-year statute of limitations applies, Hodges' deposition
testimony demonstrates that material issues of fact exist as to when the alienation
of the affections of Hodges' wife was complete. As defined by law, the statute of
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limitations for AOA begins to run "when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when
love and affection are finally lost." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 975.8
Specifically, while Hodges admits that the date of January 20, 1997 was a
damaging step in the decline of his marriage with Linda Hodges, he also states
several times in his deposition that he felt there was always a chance of
reconciliation so long as he was married to Linda Hodges. Indeed, Hodges held
out hope for such and was willing to try and salvage his marriage up until the time
when the Hodges5 divorce was finalized in February of 1998. See Hodges'
Response to Howell's Statement of Facts (R. at 168-71) and Hodges' Additional
Statement of Facts above. Moreover, Howell cannot point to any fact which
demonstrates that as of January 20, 1997, Linda Hodges' affections for Hodges

8

Retherford did not involve claims for AOA. However, in discussing the
application of the statute of limitations for acts which in their aggregate form constitute a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), the Retherford court referred
to case law from other jurisdictions which recognize that like IIED, AOA claims arise
from a "series of wrongful acts over a substantial period time," and "that the statute of
limitations begins to run when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and
affection are finally lost." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 975. Therefore, while Utah courts
have not directly addressed the question of when a claim or cause of action for AOA
accrues, the above dicta in Retherford demonstrates that AOA and IIED claims are very
similar in nature. Both are not explicitly included in any specific statute of limitations,
and both accrue in similar fashion. Hodges' position that his AOA claim also falls within
the residual four-year statute of limitations is therefore consistent and in harmony with
this Court's analysis both in Retherford and in Olsen and should be treated in similar
fashion for statute of limitations purposes.
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and vice versa were "finally lost." In fact, Hodges did not file for divorce because
of his desire to give reconciliation a chance.
Furthermore, "the law presumes that there is always a possibility of
reconciliation of husband and wife and this the law encourages." Gibson. 424
S.W.2d 871, 874 (Ark. 1968). This same principle was recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Oldrovd. 1 Utah 2d 362, 372-74,267 P.2d 759, 76768 (Utah 1954). In Wilson, the Utah Supreme Court sustained as proper the trial
court's decision to issue a jury instruction that stated that "so long as the marriage
status continues between a husband and wife, the law presumes that there is a
possibility of reconciliation even though they have become estranged or have had
marital differences." Id at 1 Utah 2d at 373, 267 P.2d at 767. The primary cause
of action alleged in Wilson was AOA.
The earliest Hodges may have felt that Linda Hodges' love was finally lost
was October 27, 1997 when Linda Hodges and Howell both revealed the extent of
their emotional relationship and for the first time admitted that their relationship
included sexual relations. (R. at 189 (Hodges deposition at 314)); (see also R. at
4, T| 20). These facts were revealed in Linda Hodges' and Howell's deposition
testimony in the divorce proceedings, and nearly four months before the Hodges'
divorce was finalized.
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In general, "[deliberate concealment by a defendant of the plaintiffs cause
of action will toll the statute of limitations." Loomer v. Rittinger. 789 S.W.2d 16,
17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, precisely when Hodges felt the alienation of
his wife's affections was complete is a factual question that must be decided by
the trier of fact. See Andreini v. Hultgress. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) ("The
governing law is clear. The point at which a person reasonably should know that
he or she has suffered a legal injury is a question of fact"); see also Gibson. 424
S.2d at 875 (holding that AOA claim accrued sometime between the parties'
separation and final divorce but the question of precisely when the claim accrued
was a question for the jury).
Hodges does not deny having suspicions or knowing that his wife's
relationship with Howell was damaging their marriage. However, Howell's
arguments in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, if accurate, would
force someone in Hodges' position to choose between two possible courses of
action: Pursue an AOA claim before all hope is lost or the divorce is finalized and
thereby lose all hope for reconciliation, or, continue to give reconciliation a
chance and avoid damaging that prospect by filing a lawsuit. Put in other terms,
the choice Howell would have Hodges make is an unfair one. Sue now and avoid
the risk of the short statute of limitations running, or risk losing your cause of
action for AOA in order to give reconciliation every chance of succeeding.
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Such choices are not only unfair, they are also unjust. The law always
prefers and encourages settlement and reconciliation, not litigation. Many
marriages survive and remain intact despite the infidelity of one spouse. The law
should be construed to allow Hodges every opportunity to hold out hope and
pursue reconciliation prior to proceeding down a course of action that would harm
those opportunities. Many divorces, including the Hodges9 divorce, take more
time to fully resolve, one way or the other, than the one-year limitations period
Howell would have this Court apply to Hodges' AOA claim. Four years gives
every would-be-AOA claimant sufficient time to pursue every avenue of
reconciliation before the law penalizes him or her and prevents him or her from
seeking legal recourse against the offending third party.
In short, regardless of which statute of limitations applies to Hodges' claim
for AOA, the question of when his cause of action for the same accrued is a
question of fact for the jury to resolve, not the trial court. The trial court therefore
erred in resolving such disputed factual issues in favor of Howell when it granted
Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE
DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT AND OUTLINE ITS
DECISION THAT HODGES' AOA CLAIMS ACCRUED MORE
THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE FILING OF HIS COMPLAINT
Rule 52(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the trial court

shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon."
Here, the trial court utterly failed to provide any findings of fact or provide any
discussion which would give any insight as to how the trial court reached its
conclusion that Hodges' AOA claim accrued more than one year prior to the filing
of his complaint. This violates the clear mandate of this state's appellate courts.
More specifically, a trial court's factual findings must contain enough detail
to reveal the reasoning process undertaken by the trial court in reaching its
decision. Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Advance Reports 45,46 (Utah
App. 1999). Put in other terms, the Court's factual findings must be articulated in
such a manner as to allow the basis of the ultimate conclusion to be understood.
Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 2.Pd 1234 1242 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.CT. 1803
fl999): see also Rucker v. Dalton 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
In short, the trial court's minute entry and ruling, and the subsequent order
signed by the trial court all fail to refer to any facts upon which the trial court
relied in determining when Hodges' AOA claim accrued or when the affections of
his wife were finally lost and alienated. The trial court further did not provide any
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discussion orfindingsthat explain how it dealt with the disputed issues of fact
presented by Hodges in his opposition to Howell's Motion for Summary
Judgment, or why the trial court felt that those facts were insufficient to create a
genuine dispute as to the material facts associated with Howell's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Therefore, because this Court is not in a position to understand or delve into
the basis for the trial court's ruling on these factual issues, a remand is in order.
However, this issue and the alleged error of the trial court to make factual findings
is clearly moot in the event this Court determines that the statute of limitations for
AOA claims is four years rather than one year as argued by Howell. Therefore,
Hodges submits this particular argument in the alternative only in the event that
this Court determines that a one-year statute of limitations applies to Hodges'
claims.
VII. Conclusion
The trial court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations for
seduction to Hodges' alienation of affection claims. Instead, the four-year
residual statute of limitations applies and Hodges' complaint was filed well within
the requisite four-year period. Additionally, the trial court erred when it resolved
the factual dispute as to when Hodges' AOA claim accrued in favor of Howell
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who was the moving party. Such questions constitute genuine issues of material
fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
Hodges respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision
granting Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case to the trial
court for a jury trial.
Dated this

day of November 1999.

BENNETT TU&LLER JOHNSON & DEERE, LLC
Barry N. Johnson
Daniel L. Steele
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Ryan Q. Hodges
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( ' u U Al'KIvAl. REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 33 et seq.
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Key N u m b e r s .
58(2).

Limitation of Actions <£=

VI1' i (In in four y e a r s .

An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, t h a t action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the lastpayment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise prov1111>iI I<11 In I
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, c h . 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, § 110.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-

tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3);
and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assigned cause of action.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Conflict of laws.
Damage of private property for public use.
Discovery rule.
Discovery rule.
Divorce actions.
Equitable actions.
Excessive freight charges.
Extension of period.
Federal civil rights actions.
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment lien
Land contract.
Malpractice.
Mortgages.
Negligent employment.
Nuisances.
Open account.
Oral contract.
Oral modification of written contract.

Other claims for relief.
— Federal claim.
— Negligence.
— Promissory estoppel.
Paternity action.
Overpayment.
Personal injuries.
Pleading and proof.
Product liability.
Purpose of section.
Quieting title.
Recovery of payments under note.
Reformation of instrument.
Relation back of complaints.
Relief not otherwise provided for.
Restraining actions.
Running of statute.
— Payment of settlement obligation.
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes.
Taking for public use.
Tax paid under protest.
Tolling.
— Class actions.
Torts.
Trustees.

LIMITATION OF \ c n o N S
-'KKK\*( r.S

C'»;

Am. Jur. 2d. - 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 56
et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions
§ 103; 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and
Employees § 548 et seq.; 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police and Constables §§ 236 to 240.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 69, 75.
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal
injury action by including action for wrongful
death after statute of limitations has run
against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.Sd
933.

78.12.29.
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Time of discovery as affecting running of
statute of limitations in wrongful death action,
49 A.L.R.4th 972.
Medical malpractice: statute of limitations in
wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535.
Fraudulent concealment of cause of action for
wrongful death as affecting period of limitations, 88A.L.R.4th851.
Key N u m b e r s . - Limitation of Actions <§=
31, 34(3).

Within one year.

An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to
an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute
imposing it prescribes a different limitation;
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction;
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested
or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property
caused by a mob or riot;
(7) on a claim for relief or a Cciuv-;
..*".
-i im-u.-i-iwii,., MTIIH. s
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fr;u,*;-i < u
. 4er Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), -\\ .••:=
fie situations limits the
time for action to four years, i n .<j '•">-£- 1 n m
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943.,
S u p p . , 104-12-29; L. 1988, c h . 59, § 15; 1989,
ch. 22, § 50; 1996, c h . 79, § 113.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac\< VYV^
ANALYSIS

Action for penalty or forfeiture.
Dismissal of action.
— Institution of second action.
Excessive freight charges.
"False arrest."
Federal civil rights actions.
Foreign statute.
— Stockholder's liability,
Libel

tion" in the beginning of Subsections (1) to (6);
and made stylisic changes.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Libel, Title 45, Chapter 2.
Riot, response and recovery, Title 63, Chapter
5a.
Seduction, §§ 78-11-4, 78-11-5.
DECISIONS
Pleading.
— Amendment of answer.
Conditions.
— Specificity.
Reckless misconduct.
— Negligence.
Running of statute.
— Delinquent taxes.
Filing of return.
— Fraud.
Discovery.
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